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the defamed person was a public official but also that a significant public
issue was present. Whether or not the Court would think the profits at
a public ski hill was a public issue significant enough to allow the inferential remarks made by the defendant is doubtful. The definition
would also prevent the random selection of people employed in a
beauracracy from being as freely attacked.
CONCLUSION

With the Times case, the Supreme Court federalized the libel laws
pertaining to public officials and ruled that a head of a police department
was a public official, and therefore any remarks made about him, regardless of the truthfulness or falsity, were privileged provided they
were not motivated by actual malice. The three concurring Justices
13
wanted the "public official" designation abolished completely.
The Rosenblatt case reaffirmed the Times decision and began the
refinement of the term "public official" by finding the superintendent of
the ski area a public official and by saying that at the very least, the
definition covers those who have or appear to the public to have con14
trol over conduct of governmental affairs.
The future may find the majority linking the term "public issue"
to the definition. Decisions will also pinpoint more exactly how far
down the line of governmental officials the Court will go. Finally,
cases involving sports figures,' 5 entertainers, etc., where the problem
becomes whether "public men," "public institutions," and "public issues" are to be included in the "public official" definition will have to
be decided. The Rosenblatt case indicates the need for a more precise
and limited definition of who falls under the Times rule of a public
official.
JAmES P. LONSDORF
Executors and Trustees: Improper Exercise of Discretionary
Power to Sell Real Estate: In Estate of ScheibeI the will declared
a residuary trust and gave the "executors and trustees full power of
sale of any interest which I may have in any real estate without special
court authority." 2 The testator died on March 11, 1958, and among
13

See Green, The Right to Communicate, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 903 (1960).

The

concurring Justices for absolute privilege were Black, Douglas and Goldberg. Green develops their theory.
14 See Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 284, 287 (1964), where it was suggested that it was
already virtually certain that the immunity will include statements about
politically appointed as well as elected officials like a justice of the peace or a
village clerk, whose exercise of power is restricted to very small communities.
Is E.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 259, 534, 535

(1964).
130 Wis.2d 116, 140 N.W.2d 196 (1966).
2 Brief for Respondent, p. 3, Estate of Scheibe, 30 Wis.2d 116, 140 N.VW.2d 196
(1966). In situations where there is no express power of sale in the governing
instrument, no statutory authorization and no inherent power to sell, the
fiduciary must seek court permission to sell and will obtain this only if there
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the assets of the residuary trust was a parcel of real estate appraised
by court appointed appraisers at $27,500 as of the date of death. In
November, 1963, the executor sold this parcel of land to his sister for
12,800, the same amount as an appraisal made a few months earlier
for loan purposes.
The beneficiaries objected to the executor's accounts and sale, but
the trial court approved the executor's conduct because "it was satisfied
the executor was honest in his sale to his sister and had received a
price in keeping with the market value as disclosed by the appraisal
•

. .- 3

The supreme court of Wisconsin reversed the trial court and re-

manded the case for consideration of whether the executor should be
surcharged or the sale set aside.
The supreme court found the duty of the executor in exercising
his power of sale to be more than simple good faith or honesty: namely,
to act "in a prudent and businesslike manner with a view to obtaining
as large a price as he might with due diligence and attention have obtained."4
Although an executor is not technically a trustee, when the testator
gives his executor additional duties that he normally would not have
to perform, it is generally held that the executor's responsibilities are
the same as a trustee's with respect to the additional duties.5 In Scheibe,
the court held that if an additional power is granted to an executor, it
may be considered a power held as trustee and that "[tlhe power of
sale without special court authority is a trust power .... -6 Thus the
executor in Scheibe was held to be acting as a trustee with respect to
his power of sale.
A settlor or testator certainly is permitted to confer a power of
sale on a fiduciary and, thus, in the situations where he does confer such
a power, he should be able to control, to an extent, the test which the
courts will apply in examining the fiduciary's exercise or nonexercise
of that power. Express trust powers may either be mandatory or discretionary.' So long as the power is expressed, the fiduciary need not seek
court permission to sell the asset, nor must he notify the beneficiaries
of his intention to sell unless that is made a condition precedent to his
exercise of the power.'
is an implied power of sale in the governing instrument or statutory provision
impowering the court to confer such a power on a fiduciary under specified
conditions. For an example of the situation where courts will imply a power
of sale, see Will of Walker, 258 Wis. 65, 45 N.W.2d 94 (1950), and for statutory authority see WIs. STAT. §231.31 (1965).
Estate of Scheibe, 30 Wis.2d 116, 118, 140 N.W.2d 196, 197-198 (1966).
• Id at 121-122, 140 N.W.2d at 199.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §6, comment b (19 9).
6 Estate of Scheibe, 30 Wis.2d 116, 119, 140 N.W.2d 196, 198 (1966).
BO(;ERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §741 (2d ed. 1962).
s Estate of Friedman, 251 Wis. 180, 28 N.W.2d 261 (1947) ; Estate of Fritsch,
259 Wis. 295, 48 N.W.2d 606 (1951). See also cases cited in BOC;ERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES

§741, at 558 (2d ed. 1962).
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Where the fiduciary is given a mandatory power, he must exercise
that power. Thus, in Estate of Cullen,9 the court found against the
trustee without discussing the reasonableness of his actions, but simply
because he failed to exercise his power of sale: "The direction to convert, together with the permission to retain certain investments, leaves
no doubt that the land is to be sold and turned into cash or other property readily divisible in kind." 10
Where the fiduciary is given a discretionary power, the Restatement
of Trusts takes the position that the courts must find an abuse of the
fiduciary's discretion before they can interfere with his exercise or nonexercise of the power."' This abuse of discretion test, however, is dependent upon the extent of discretion conferred on the fiduciary and
the Restatement has classified the extent of discretion as either simple
or extended.n In the case of a simple discretionary power, the Restatement asserts there would be no particular words in the creating instrument extending the fiduciary's discretion,'1 3 and the fiduciary would be
"under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise
such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in
dealing with his own property. .... -14 An extended discretionary power,
however, would be "indicated by a provision in the trust instrument
that the trustee shall have 'absolute' or 'unlimited' or 'uncontrolled' discretion." 15 The effect of extending the fiduciary's discretion in the
exercise or non-exercise of a power is to relax the duty of reasonable
care he is under with a simple discretionary power. The Restatement
describes the duty the fiduciary is under with an extended discretionary
power as only to act "in a state of mind in which it was contemplated
by the settlor that he would act ....

Thus, the trustee will not be per-

mitted to act dishonestly, or from some motive other than the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust, or ordinarily to act arbitrarily
without an exercise of his judgment."' 16 The problem one encounters in
distinguishing between the simple discretionary power and the extended
discretionary power is one of construing the words in the clause granting the power, for the extent of discretion conferred depends upon the
intent of the creator.' 7
p231 Wis. 292, 285 N.W. 759 (1939).
Id. at 297, 285 N.W. at 761.
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §187 (1959). See also Scoyrr. TRUSTS §187 (2d
ed. 1956) ; BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §560 (2d ed. 1960).
12 For a discussion of a number of cases rejecting the Restatement's classification of discretionary powers and holding all fiduciaries exercising a discretion"o

ary power to a standard of reasonable care, see BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

.560 (2d ed. 1960).

j (1959).
§174 (1959).
TRUSTS §187, comment j at 408 (1959).

13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

TRUSTS §187, comment

14 RESTATEMENT
15 RESTATEMENT

TRUSTS

(SECOND),
(SECOND),

16 Id at 408-409.
Lueft v. Lueft, 129 Wis. 534, 109 N.W. 652 (1906). The theory behind the
relaxed duty of a fiduciary with an extended discretionary power is:

27
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held the fiduciary with a simple
discretionary power to a duty of reasonable and prudent conduct
whether he exercises the power or not.18 But in Estate of Teasdale19
the trust instrument provided: "In the carrying out of this provision
the determination by my said trustees of any and all values of my property shall not be open to review, but final and conclusive.

20

The court

explicitly recognized the trustee's power as an extended discretionary
power and accepted the Restatement's "state of mind" test for judging
the fiduciary's conduct:
The words do dispense with the standard of reasonableness in
judging the trustee's conduct but do not permit him to act dishonestly or act in a state of mind in which the trustor did not
contemplate he would act. The courts will not permit him to act
dishonestly or from some motive other than the accomplishment
of the purposes of the trust. 21 (Emphasis added.)

Again, in Estate of Koos,2 the clause granting the fiduciary his
power was clear as to the intent of the creator; it provided that the
trustees shall "be clothed with absolute rights, powers, and discretions ....
-23 While construing this clause, the court reiterated and
emphasized that it had adopted the Restatement's classification and
tests for discretionary powers:
s It is the rule in this state that when under a will a fiduciary
is granted absolute or conclusive powers and discretions, the test
of "reasonableness" or "reasonable judgment" is not applicable.
A court may not exact the standard of "reasonable judgment"
from such fiduciary invested with such authority. The court may
interfere only with
24 the bad faith, fraud or mere arbitrary action
of such fiduciary.
Recently, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not clearly
indicated whether it still makes the distinction as to the classification of
discretionary powers. In Will of Clarenbach2 5 a bare majority of the
court found an abuse of discretion by the trustees of their power to
The settlor has created a trust to accomplish certain objectives. When
he gives his trustee great freedom of action in the administration of
the trust, he surely must intend the qualification that the trustee shall act
with some regard to the purposes of the trust, and not make decisions
which frustrate the accomplishment of the settlor's intent; and also
that he shall employ his discretion deliberately and with some thought
and not recklessly or capriciously, and furthermore in a spirit of good
faith and honesty. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §560, at 119 (2d ed.
1960).
is BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTS §552, at 16 (2d ed. 1960).
10 261 Wis. 248, 52 N.W2d 366 (1952).
201 d. at 252, 52 N.W.2d at 368.
21 Id. at 261, 52 N.W.2d at 372.
22269 Wis. 478, 69 N.W.2d 598 (1955).
23 Id. at 483, 69 N.W.2d at 601.
24 Id. at 492, 69 N.W.2d at 605.
2523 Wis.2d 71, 126 N.W2d 614 (1964), noted in 48 MARQ. L. REV. 262 (1964).
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allocate receipts to principal or income. The trust clause the trustees
were relying on provided:
(G) I hereby grant to my executors the power to determine how
all receipts, whether realized or accrued (inclusive of stocks,
rights, securities received upon reconversion or upon reorganization, or other securities) and all disbursements, whether paid or
accrued, shall be charged or apportioned as between income and
principal in making current or final distributions, and the decision of the executors shall be final and not subject to question by
any court or by any beneficiary hereof.26 (Emphasis added.)

Neither the majority nor the minority clearly identified the trust power
as one of simple discretion or extended discretion, but the language of
the granting clause is unmistakably similar to the language of the clause
in Teasdale which would place the power in the extended discretionary
area. Although the majority and minority differed on the factual determination of the trustees' conduct, the test applied by the majority would
indicate that the court was still following the Restatement's test: "We
consider that the account filed by the trustees ... clearly establish that the
trustees did not make a good-faith decision that the $10,000 of profits
constituted income and not principal.

' 27

In Will of Mueller28 the court was faced with construing two testamentmentary trusts and an inter vivos trust. When the appellant petitioned the court for approval of the accounts, the beneficiaries of all
the trusts objected, and, in the final analysis, the supreme court treated
all the trusts on an equal basis with respect to the trustees' duty to diversify. All three trusts contained this provision: "my said trustees to
retain among the assets of said trust estate all of the stock of said L. J.
Mueller Furnace Company, with express authority to purchase additional common stock of said corporation. 29 As to this provision, all the
trusts provided:
[Article FIFTH] (c) Said trustees may in their discretion participate in and make any payments required by any proceedings
for the reorganization, refinancing, dissolution, or other transactions, including the acquisition of stock rights when offered,
and may accept substituted or distributed stocks and securities,
in respect of any corporate securities subsisting in said trusts. 30
(Emphasis added by the court.)
The appellant contended that these provisions alone would not authorize the trustees to retain substituted stock as the sole asset of the
trusts, but that the testamentary trusts contained an additional provision,
26

Will of Clarenbach, 23 Wis.2d 71, 74, 126 N.W.2d 614, 615-616 (1964).

27 Id. at 76, 126 N.W.2d at 617.
2828 Wis.2d 26, 135 N.W.2d 854 (1965), noted in 49 MARQ. L. Rzv. 642 (1966).
29 Will of Mueller, 28 Wis.2d 26, 34 n. 2, 135 N.W.2d 854, 858, n. 2 (1965).

30 Id. at 34, 135 N.W.2d at 859.
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not indluded in the inter vivos trust, which would sanction such retention:
My trustees shall have power in their discretion to take, receive, hold, administer, collect, invest and reinvest the assets of
said trust estates, with full power to bargain, sell, and convey at
such prices and upon such terms as to them may seem best, or to
exchange or otherwise realize upon any or all of the assets of
said trust estates as and when said trustees, in their discretion,
deem it advisable.. .31 (Emphasis added by the court.)
The court stated that the provisions of the testamentary trusts did
give the trustees the authority to retain the original assets intact, but
because the corporation whose stock constituted the entire original
corpus of the trusts was reorganized and the new corporation was
different in size, management, and production, the new stock was not
substantially equivalent to the original stock, and, therefore, the trustees
were under a duty to diversify the assets of the trusts. Apparently the
court viewed the additional provision in the testamentary trusts as only
granting simple discretion to the trustees and therefore imposed the
reasonable care duty on the trustees with respect to their power to retain assets.
Now, in Scheibe, the court again failed to explicitly distinguish between extended and simple discretion. Literally read, Scheibe even
seems to indicate that the court will hold a fiduciary with a power to
a duty of reasonable care regardless of the extent of discretion conferred on him by the governing instrument, at least a fiduciary with a
power of sale. The clause in the will giving the executor the power of
sale32 appears to be one of the simple discretionary type, while the language of the court appears to label the power of sale as one of extended
discretion. In discussing the executor's duty under his power of sale,
the court stated:
In granting an unlimited power of sale, we do not believe the
testator intended his executor to be relieved from the duty of
acting as a reasonably prudent man with loyalty to beneficiaries.
Quite the contrary, the necessity of court approval and its safeguards are dispensed with as needless because of the testator's
trust in the executor to act with loyalty and as an ordinary prudent man.33 (Emphasis added.)
And: "Consequently, an executor with an unqualified power of sale
must exercise the diligence and caution which a careful and prudent
31 Id. at 35, 135 N.W.2d at 859.
32 "1 give to my executors and trustees full power of sale of any interest which
I may have in any real estate without special court authority." Brief for
Respondent, p. 3, Estate of Scheibe, 30 Wis.2d 116, 140 N.W.2d 196 (1966).
3 Estate of Scheibe, 30 Wis.2d 116, 122, 140 N.W.2d 196, 199-200 (1966).
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owner would observe in the sale of his own property.34 (Emphasis
added.) Further, the court states:
A trustee or an executor, in whom there has been imposed a
special trust or confidence, must act not only honestly or with
good faith in the narrow sense but must also exercise the duty of
loyalty toward the beneficiary for whose benefit the power of
sale is to be exercised and with such care and skill as a man of
ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property.3 5 (Emphasis added.)
The court's reference to such terms as "unlimited" and "unqualified"
and "good faith" certainly implies that it is dealing with an extended
discretionary power of sale, but in each case the court follows such
terms with a statement of the duty of reasonable care. Although misleading and seemingly inconsistent with the Teasdale and Koos cases,
the language of the court is not so clear as to support the conclusion
that the court has jettisoned the distinction between simple and extended
discretionary powers. However, since Koos in 1955, the only recognition
of the Restatement's classification of express discretionary powers has
been implied from the duty the court held the fiduciary to in Clarenbach
and Mueller.
If it is assumed the misleading language of Scheibe can be attributed
to arx overgeneralization or to simply loose language, the facts could
have supported a finding against the executor on either his duty of reasonable care or his duty of loyalty. This would mean the court only
found the executor to have a simple discretionary power of sale, and
then the Scheibe decision would be consistent with prior Wisconsin
law. Once the court found the duty of the executor to be that of reasonable care, it found the executor's exercise of the power of sale unreasonable. The price he received for the real estate, alone, was suspicious,
for he sold the real estate for $12,800 while the tax assessed value of it
was $13,400, and the appraised value as of the date of death of the
testator was $27,500. The court combined the price issue with the fact
that the executor made no effort to consult or hire a real estate broker
and stated that "[u]nder the facts we believe the executor did not act
in a prudent and businesslike manner with a view to obtaining as large
a price as he might with due diligence and attention have obtained. The
executor failed in his trust.3 6 This would indicate that when a fiduciary
has a simple discretionary power of sale, he should be quite diligent in
ascertaining the price at which he sells the real estate.
Although the court discussed the duty of loyalty, it did not seem
to rest its decision on it. The duty of loyalty is a separate duty from
341d. at

35

36

120, 140 N.W.2d at 199.
Id. at 119, 140 N.W.2d at 198.
Id. at 121-122, 140 N.W.2d at 199.
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the duty of reasonable care and requires the fiduciary to act "solely in
'
the interest of the beneficiary."31
The fiduciary has a duty of loyalty
regardless of the extent of discretion conferred on him, but the duty
can be reduced by specific statements allowing the fiduciary to act for
his own account with reference to his fiduciary duties.3 8 No such relaxation of the duty of loyalty was given the executor in Scheibe. The court
cited Noonan Estate 9 in connection with its discussion of the duty of
loyalty and could have used the test for loyalty set forth therein to have
found against the executor in Scheibe: "The test of forbidden self-dealing is whether the fiduciary had a personal interest in the subject transaction of such a substantial nature that it might have affected his judgment in material connection.1' 40 Certainly a combination of the facts in

Scheibe could have supported a finding of "forbidden self-dealing",
for the executor sold the parcel of real estate in issue to his sister and
after such sale he stopped paying the $90 per month rent he had been
paying to the estate for living there.
Had the court explicitly found against the executor for a violation
of the duty of loyalty, the distinction between simple and extended discretionary powers would have been irrelevant for the duty of loyalty
would be the same under either discretionary power. But since the
court seemed to rest its decision on the duty of reasonable care and simultaneously labeled the power of sale exercised by the executor as
"unlimited" and "unqualified", there is some doubt whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court still recognizes the distinction between simple
and extended discretionary powers of sale.
JOSEPH C. NIEBLER

37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §170, at 364 (1959).

ss"By the terms of the trust the trustee may be permitted to sell trust property
to himself individually, or as trustee to purchase property from himself individually, or to lend to himself money held by him in trust, or otherwise to
deal with the trust property on his own account." RESTATEMENT
TRUSTS §170, comment t at 372 (1959).

39361
40 Id.

Pa. 26, 63 A.2d 80 (1949).
at 29, 63 A.2d at 83.

(SEcOND),

